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What does vulnerability and patch data say?
by Guido schryen
is open 
source 
security  
a myth?
the impact of open source on software 
security remains controversial. Propo-
nents of OSS stress the strength of the 
resulting review process19 and argue in 
the sense of Raymond20 that, “Given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” 
while some opponents follow the argu-
ment of Levy,11 who remarks “Sure, the 
source code is available. But is anyone 
reading it?” Interestingly, Ozment and 
Schechter18 report that in the Open-
BSD source, foundational vulnerabili-
ties have a median lifetime of at least 
2.6 years, which seems to refute Ray-
mond’s argument.
While the security discussion is 
rife with beliefs and guesses, only a 
few quantitative models and some 
empirical studies appear in the litera-
ture.1,9,10,13,17,21,24,25 Many of these em-
pirical studies investigate one package 
or a few software packages only, and to 
my best knowledge, no prior study has 
been conducted to comprehensively 
study differences between open source 
and closed source security. The reason 
why comprehensive empirical studies 
have been neglected is probably due to 
the need for laborious collection and 
analysis of reliable data and the associ-
ated manual work.
This article presents a comprehen-
sive empirical investigation of pub-
lished vulnerabilities and patches of 
17 widely deployed open source and 
closed source software packages. The 
empirical analysis uses comprehen-
sive vulnerability data contained in 
the NIST National Vulnerability Da-
tabase14 and a newly compiled data 
set of vulnerability patches. Based on 
these comprehensive data sets, this 
study is capable of providing empirical 
evidence that open source and closed 
source software development do not 
significantly differ in terms of vulner-
ability disclosure and vendors’ patch-
ing behavior, a phenomenon that has 
been widely assumed, but hardly in-
vestigated.
open and closed source software
Generally, the availability of source 
code to the public is a precondition 
During the past  few decades we became accustomed 
to acquiring software by procuring licenses for a 
proprietary, or binary-only, immaterial object. We 
regard software as a product we have to pay for, just as 
we would pay for material objects. However, in more 
recent years, this widely cultivated habit has begun to 
be accompanied by a software model characterized by 
software that comes with a compilable source code. 
This type of software is referred to by the term “open 
source software” (OSS).
While there is consensus that opening up source 
code to the public increases the number of reviewers, 
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for software being denoted as “open 
source software.” Beyond this require-
ment, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) 
has defined a set of compliance criteria 
for open source software.15 The (open 
source) definition (OSD) includes per-
mission to modify the code and to re-
distribute it. However, it does not gov-
ern the software development process 
in terms of who is eligible to generate 
and to modify software. In this regard, 
two options are distinguished by Ray-
mond:20 When what is called “bazaar 
style” is in place, any volunteer can 
provide source code submissions. In a 
more closed environment, software is 
crafted by individual wizards, and the 
development process is characterized 
by a relatively strong control of design 
and implementation. This style is re-
ferred to as “cathedral style.”
The OSI approved several licenses, 
including the Apache License, the BSD 
license, and the GNU General Public Li-
cense (GPL), which is maintained by the 
Free Software Foundation (FSF). The 
FSF provides a definition of “‘free soft-
ware’ [as] a matter of liberty, not price.”8 
In contrast to the OSD definition, the 
FSF definition explicitly focuses on the 
option of releasing the improvements 
to the public. Software is usually regard-
ed as “closed” if the source code is not 
available to the public.
The categorization of software and 
its development process as “open 
source software (development)” or 
“free software (development)” in con-
trast to “closed source software (de-
velopment)” mirrors the perspective 
of developers and specifies the type of 
development. Complementarily, one 
could also adopt the software users’ 
point of view by distinguishing be-
tween software that is charged for and 
software that is free of charge. The re-
sulting classification scheme is shown 
in Table 1.
the Life cycle of Vulnerabilities 
and Patches
When software is executed in a way 
which is different from that which the 
original software designers intended, 
this misbehavior is rooted in software 
bugs. Anderson3 assumes the ratio 
between software bugs and software 
lines of code (SLOC) to be about 1:35. 
When bugs can be directly used by at-
tackers to gain access to a system or 
network, they are termed “vulnerabili-
ties” by the U.S. MITRE Corporation.12 
Although there are other definitions 
of “vulnerabilities,”16,23 the adoption 
of the MITRE definition is useful in a 
pragmatic sense for three reasons:
˲˲ Most empirical studies implicitly 
use this definition by analyzing “Com-
mon Vulnerability and Exposures 
(CVE)” entries, which are provided by 
MITRE. CVE identifiers are not only 
widely used by researchers, they are also 
used by information security product/
service vendors. Thereby, the CVE defi-
table 1. classification of software.
users’  
perspective open source (license) closed source
Free of charge linux, apache web server adobe acrobat Reader
Subject to charge MySQl (dual licensing1) Microsoft Windows  
operating systems
1  “[D]istributors that…do not wish to distribute the source code for the commercially licensed software 
under version 2 of the GNU General Public License (the “GPL”) must enter into a commercial license 
agreement with Sun.“ (http://www.mysql.com/about/legal/licensing/oem/)
developers’  
perspective
figure 1. Vulnerability life cycle.
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nition has become a de facto standard.
˲˲ The process of accepting a po-
tential software bug as a CVE vulner-
ability is well documented, and the 
assessment is conducted by security 
experts.12
˲˲ The U.S. National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) adopts 
the MITRE understanding of vulner-
abilities in its National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD), which is probably the 
largest database of security-critical 
software bugs and which provides 
comprehensive CVE vulnerability data 
feeds for automated processing.
Vulnerabilities and their dynamic 
behavior can be described through 
the “vulnerability life cycle,” which is 
shown in Figure 1 as a UML statechart 
diagram. The diagram provides a pro-
cess-oriented perspective on a single 
vulnerability and its patch (for the  con-
sideration of exploits see the study of 
Frei9), integrates states that have been 
introduced by Arbaugh et al.,5 and 
uses a cycle to account for the fact that 
patching vulnerabilities can even cre-
ate new vulnerabilities.5
Injection: The life cycle starts with 
the injection of a vulnerability into 
the software. In principle, a vulner-
ability can find its way into software 
through the intentional behavior of 
software developers, who strive to sell 
or exploit vulnerabilities, or to harm 
their employer, or unintentional be-
havior, which can be rooted in careless 
programming or in using “insecure” 
development tools. After testing, the 
software is finally released, the pub-
lic starts searching for vulnerabilities, 
and the software vendor potentially 
continues searching.
Discovery and publication: The dis-
covery of vulnerabilities can be based 
on coincidental detection or on the 
active search of persons with intrinsic 
or with extrinsic motivation. The emer-
gence of vulnerability markets,22 in-
cluding bug auctions, bug challenges, 
and vulnerability brokers,7 provides 
economic incentives (at least for “white 
hats”) to search for and to disclose in-
formation on vulnerabilities.
When a vulnerability is discovered, 
the question of whether it should be 
published or not occurs. If a “black 
hat” detects the vulnerability, his or 
her decision depends on whether s/he 
aims at making the vulnerability avail-
able to as many other “black hats” as 
possible and to gain reputation, or to 
a closed group of potential attackers. If 
the vulnerability is detected by a “white 
hat,” including the software vendor, 
it is still not clear whether the vulner-
ability should be published or not, as 
vulnerability information is useful for 
both the “good guys,” who can provide 
patches, and the “bad guys,” who prob-
ably would not have gained knowledge 
of the vulnerability otherwise. Some 
researchers have addressed this ques-
tion: Rescorla21 argues against dis-
closure, as he finds the probability of 
vulnerability rediscovery to be vanish-
ingly small. However, investigating the 
operating system OpenBSD, Ozment17 
finds that vulnerabilities are correlated 
regarding their rediscovery, and argues 
in favor of disclosure.
Patching: Once a vulnerability is 
published, at first glance it seems ob-
vious that the vendor should provide 
a patch as soon as possible. But it can 
be economically reasonable for the 
vendor not to provide a patch when it 
is the customers who suffer the most 
cost of failure and when competitors 
behave likewise. If the vulnerability is 
not published (and detected by “white 
hats” other than the vendor), again, 
the question arises of whether the 
vendor should provide a patch or not. 
While the aforementioned economic 
argument still holds, the decision not 
to provide a patch may be rooted in the 
assumptions that a nonpublished vul-
nerability is hardly exposed to attacks; 
any vulnerability disclosure reduces 
the vendor’s reputation; and the patch 
reveals the vulnerability to attackers, 
who then try to compile exploits and to 
use them to attack unpatched systems.
When a vulnerability patch is avail-
able, the search for newly injected 
vulnerabilities starts since it is known 
that patches can contain new vulnera-
bilities.6 As the injection refers to a new 
vulnerability, Figure 1 shows a dashed 
line. An overview of the classification of 
vulnerabilities is provided in Figure 2.
The previous discussion of the life 
cycle stresses that the empirical securi-
ty of software goes beyond technologi-
cal phenomena and also depends on 
economic conditions. In the particu-
lar context of open source and closed 
source software, Anderson2 shows that 
although, under ideal conditions, open 
and closed systems are equally secure, 
this symmetry can be broken owing to 
figure 3. selected open source and closed source software packages.
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economic phenomena.
investigated software Packages
In order to draw a picture of empiri-
cal open source and closed source 
software security, it seems alluring to 
consider as many software packages 
and vulnerability data as possible. But 
this (quantitative) approach suffers 
from at least two limitations. First, for 
many software packages only (too) few 
vulnerability data is available, as the 
packages are rarely deployed and prob-
ably hardly attractive for attackers. Sec-
ond, a comparison of open source and 
closed source software remains strong-
ly biased, unless the software packages 
under consideration are comparable 
in terms of functionality. However, for 
many open source and closed source 
software packages, no functional coun-
terparts are available. 
Due to these issues, I decided to 
follow a qualitative approach, and to 
manually select widely deployed soft-
ware packages for the empirical analy-
sis. Assuming that most software is 
usually attacked through the Internet, 
I adopt the client-server perspective to 
frame the selection of software pack-
ages (see Figure 3). On the client side, 
the most widely deployed operating 
systems (OS) are Microsoft OS, MAC OS 
X and Linux derivatives (http://market-
share.hitslink.com). Among the Mi-
crosoft OS, Windows 2000, Windows 
XP, and Windows Vista are the leading 
ones in terms of market share, but I 
excluded the latter due to its short his-
tory (release date: January 30, 2007). 
Regarding Linux, I selected Red Hat 
Linux and Debian Linux, which are 
widely deployed Linux distributions. 
In addition to operating systems, I an-
alyze web browsers, email clients, and 
office software. Regarding web brows-
ers, Internet Explorer and Firefox are 
the most widely used programs (http://
marketshare.hitslink.com), regard-
ing email clients and office software, I 
found no reliable statistics. I selected 
Outlook Express and Thunderbird, 
which are comparable in terms of 
functionality in contrast to Outlook, 
which integrates much more function-
ality, and MS Office (Word, Excel, and 
Powerpoint) and OpenOffice.
On the server side, I analyze Web 
servers and (relational) database man-
agement systems (DBMS), which are 
widely used application types. Internet 
Information Services and Apache are 
the most frequently used Web servers 
(http://news.netcraft.com/archives/
web_server_survey.html). Oracle and 
DB2 are two of the mostly used closed 
source DBMS (http://www.gartner.
com/it/page.jsp?id=507466), while for 
open source DBMS no reliable data 
could be found. Having explored da-
tabase-related Web sites, I decided to 
use mySQL and PostgreSQL, which are 
widely deployed. The specific versions 
of the software packages are given in 
Table 2.
Vulnerabilities
Having decided to adopt the vulner-
ability definition of the MITRE CVE 
group (discussion earlier), the ques-
tion remains of how to gather CVE data 
as the CVE group “…only contains the 
standard identifier number with status 
indicator, a brief description, and ref-
erences to related vulnerability reports 
and advisories” (http://cve.mitre.org/
about/faqs.html). I decided to use the 
NIST National Vulnerability Database 
(NVD) (http://nvd.nist.gov/)14, which 
provides full database functionality 
for the complete MITRE CVE diction-
ary. Information on MITRE CVE vul-
nerabilities and the NIST NVD is pro-
vided on the Web sites of MITRE12 and 
NIST,14 respectively.
Vulnerability data. I discuss the 
quality of used data and the implica-
tions of how the MITRE CVE diction-
ary and the NIST NVD are built for the 
analysis of vulnerabilities. As the data 
sources of the CVE group are manifold 
and include trustworthy organizations, 
such as US-CERT and SecurityFocus, 
the CVE input can be assumed to be 
comprehensive, although it cannot be 
guaranteed that all disclosed vulner-
abilities are considered. The analysis 
of potential vulnerabilities by the MI-
TRE CVE group assures that each CVE 
candidate has been inspected by secu-
table 2. Vulnerability data.
application 
type Product devel. type release date #vuln
mtbVd 
[days]
development of  
vulnerability  
disclosure over time
Browser Internet 
Explorer 7
Closed 2006-10-18 74 13.29 linear
Firefox 2 open (BS) 2006-10-24 167 5.16 linear
Email client MS 
outlook 
Express 6
Closed 2001-10-25 23 120.73 linear
Thunder-
bird 1
open (CS) 2004-12-07 110 13.79 not linear
Web server IIS 5 Closed 2000-02-17 83 40.90 not linear
apache2 open (CS) 2000-03-10 80 40.63 linear
office MS office 
2003
Closed 2003-11-17 99 19.22 not linear
openof-
fice2
open (CS) 2005-10-20 19 63.16 linear
operating 
system
Windows 
2000
Closed 2000-02-174 358 9.35 linear
Windows 
XP
Closed 2001-10-25 297 8.97 linear
Mac oS X 
10.2
Closed2 2005-04-29 300 4.64 linear
Red Hat  
Enterprise 
linux 4
open (CS) 3006-02-14 2641 5.48 not linear
Debian 3.1 open (BS) 2005-06-06 2071 6.45 linear
Database 
Management 
System
mySQl 5 open (BS) 2005-10-24 33 46.00 linear
Post-
greSQl 8
open (CS) 2005-01-19 25 58.96 linear
oracle 10g Closed 2004-01-15 63 29.75 not linear
DB2 v8 Closed 2004-03-26 13 136.38 linear
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rity professionals. In cases where soft-
ware vendors dispute vulnerabilities, 
I chose to use MITRE data in favor of 
an unbiased assessment. Overall, the 
CVE dictionary is a valuable resource 
for vulnerability analysis in terms of 
both quantity and quality. As the NVD 
acquisition procedure considers all 
CVE vulnerabilities in a timely manner 
and provides them in xml data feeds, 
the NVD is an appropriate database for 
the analysis of vulnerabilities in gen-
eral. However, while the NVD provides 
a comprehensive database of (CVE) 
vulnerabilities, the properties of some 
vulnerability attributes added by NVD 
analysts need some more attention:
˲˲ Original release date (ORD): Owing 
to two potential time gaps, the ORD as-
signed to a CVE identifier by the NVD 
does not necessarily mirror the actual 
date of disclosure:  Time between the 
actual disclosure of a vulnerability and 
its consideration in the “Assigned” 
phase of the MITRE CVE workflow. 
This gap is zero when the vulnerabil-
ity has not been disclosed to the pub-
lic. Moreover, time between the “As-
signed” date and the NVD publication 
date. As no information on the overall 
time gaps is available, the computation 
of patch times and exploit times would 
contain errors of unknown size. How-
ever, I assume the effect of the errors 
on the particular types of development 
of vulnerability disclosure over time 
(for example, linear or S-shape) to be 
less important, as this development is 
not affected by the full time gaps, but 
only by differences between the time 
gaps (standard deviation of time gaps). 
In addition, unusually large time gaps 
would be detectable in the graphics 
shown in Figure 4.
˲˲  Common Weakness Enumeration 
(CWE): The NVD analysis team assigns 
a type (for example, buffer overflow) 
to a vulnerability, based on a subset of 
the MITRE CWE structure. However, 
by Dec. 31, 2008, only about one fourth 
of all NVD CVE entries (9,748 out of 
34,091) contained a CWE name so that 
an analysis of vulnerability types is not 
reasonable.
˲˲  Common Platform Enumeration 
(CPE): The NVD applies the structured 
naming scheme CPE, provided by MI-
TRE, to assign names of vulnerable 
product versions to CVE identifiers.
˲˲ Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS): Vulnerabilities are 
scored by the NVD analysis team re-
garding their severity. CVSS 2.0 pro-
vides for three scores, with each score 
value being between 0 and 10 (highest 
severity). The base score is an aggre-
gation of six base score metrics. This 
score is mandatory, and specified by 
vulnerability bulletin analysts and soft-
ware vendors. The NVD team works 
closely with the CVSS working group, 
MITRE, public vulnerability sites, ven-
dors and security researchers to come 
to a consensus on scoring some of the 
more commonly occurring vulnerabili-
ties. Other score types are the temporal 
score and the environmental score. For 
our analysis, only the base score is ap-
plicable. It should be noted that the 
NVD scoring system changed over time: 
CVSS 2.0 scores for the CVE vulnerabil-
ities published prior to 9/11/2005 were 
converted by the NVD team from prior 
CVSS metric data. The investigation of 
the NVD conversion script provided by 
the NVD Program Manager (C. John-
son) reveals that for all CVSS 2 charac-
teristics corresponding CVSS 1 charac-
teristics are available, and a “natural” 
conversion was conducted. To sum up, 
older scores that have been converted 
into CVSS 2 are comparable with “new” 
CVSS 2 scores. Based on the afore-
mentioned analysis, I regard CVSS 2.0 
scores to be useful for further analysis.
The following analysis of NVD vul-
nerabilities is based on NVD xml data 
feeds as available on Jan. 31, 2009. All 
feeds were imported into MS Office 
Excel 2007 and processed using fil-
ters and MS Query. In order to assure 
that vulnerabilities listed in the NVD 
data feeds have not been accidentally 
misattributed regarding the affected 
software version, I double-checked the 
affected software versions of each vul-
nerability on the Web sites of vendors, 
MITRE, and SecurityFocus. In very few 
cases of inconsistencies, I excluded the 
particular vulnerability from any fur-
ther analysis.
Mean time between vulnerability 
disclosures. Table 2 lists for each soft-
ware package the number of published 
vulnerabilities and the “mean time 
between vulnerability disclosures” 
(MTBVD) defined—analogously to 
the software engineering term “mean 
time between failures”—as the average 
number of days since software release 
there is also 
no observable 
difference between 
open source 
software developed 
in bazaar style 
and open source 
software developed 
in cathedral style.
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divided by the number of published 
vulnerabilities. With regard to deter-
mining the MTBVD, I consider only 
those vulnerabilities that have been 
published after the release date. Vul-
nerabilities that have been published 
earlier than the release date and that 
also affect the version under consid-
eration are due to the development 
process of earlier versions. A simple 
comparison of the MTBVD of software 
packages does presumably not provide 
reliable results regarding the level of 
security because of two reasons: the se-
verity of vulnerabilities should be con-
sidered, for example by using vulner-
ability weights, and the vulnerability 
detection and publication are probably 
correlated with market and software 
factors. For example, an important 
market factor is the attractiveness of 
the software for “vulnerability search-
ers,” an important software factor is 
software size, as given by “software 
lines of code” (SLOC). However, reli-
able and precise figures are available 
for few software packages only, so that 
figures must not be used for a fair com-
parison of security levels. On the other 
hand, MTBVD data is not useless as it 
provides an impression of how often 
vulnerabilities are published and how 
insecure especially operating systems 
are, regardless of the particular devel-
opment style. Overall, data suggests 
the vulnerability publication rate is 
probably determined by other factors 
than the software development style.
Development of vulnerability disclo-
sure over time. While the previous dis-
cussion provides a static picture of the 
history of vulnerabilities, I now address 
the development of vulnerabilities over 
time. In an earlier empirical investiga-
tion, Alhazmi et al.1 assume the devel-
opment of vulnerability discovery can 
be described by an “S” shape. However, 
the analysis of vulnerability data shows 
that for 12 of 17 considered software 
packages a linear correlation between 
time and the number of published vul-
nerabilities is found (see Table 2 and 
Figure 4). This supports Rescorla’s ar-
gument that the rate of vulnerability 
finding is constant over long periods 
of time. The reason why five packages 
show a different behavior is not clear. 
Interestingly, three closed source pack-
ages (MS Office, Oracle, and DB2) and 
one open source package (Apache) 
show no vulnerability disclosure during 
the first 316, 202, 460, and 367 days, re-
spectively, while for all other packages 
vulnerabilities were published quickly 
after their release. The available vulner-
ability data explains these large time 
gaps only partially:
˲˲ In contrast to the other three pack-
ages, Apache 2 was a substantial re-
write of much of the Apache 1.x code. 
As knowledge of vulnerabilities of 
Apache 1.x was of very limited use for 
finding vulnerabilities in Apache 2, the 
discovery of the first vulnerabilities 
could be expected to take a while, but it 
seems questionable as to whether this 
explains a one-year gap. Data on pub-
lished vulnerabilities does not tell us 
whether the quality of code prevented 
vulnerabilities from being detected 
quickly or whether discovered vulnera-
bilities were published later or are even 
still unpublished.
˲˲ In the case of DB2, the software 
showed only 13 vulnerabilities, so that 
a large time gap is less surprising.
˲˲ Regarding Oracle, the NVD pub-
lished the first (ten) vulnerabilities 
altogether on Aug. 4, 2004. It seems 
reasonable to assume that these pub-
lished vulnerabilities had been de-
tected much earlier and that their pub-
lication was delayed either by Oracle, 
MITRE, or NIST NVD.
˲˲ The case of Office 2003 showed 
none of the aforementioned reasons. 
Vulnerability data does not reveal why 
the first vulnerabilities were published 
so late.
Despite the aforementioned minor 
issues in analyzing vulnerability data, 
overall there is no observable differ-
ence between open source and closed 
source software with regard to the (type 
of) development of vulnerabilities over 
time, and there is also no observable 
difference between open source soft-
ware developed in bazaar style and 
open source software developed in ca-
thedral style.
Severity of published vulnerabili-
ties. Having considered the number of 
vulnerabilities, I now analyze whether 
open source and closed source soft-
ware differ in the severity of published 
vulnerabilities. This perspective is im-
portant as well, because a single highly 
severe vulnerability that enables at-
tackers to get root access to a system 
is probably more  crucial than 10 low 
severe vulnerabilities that grant only 
reading access to unauthorized users. 
table 3. severity of published vulnerabilities.
application 
type Product
severity (range=[0;10])
mean median
std. 
dev.
Proportion of highly 
sever vulnerabilities
([7;10])
median  
of medians
Browser
Internet Explorer 7* 6.65 6.80 2.07 45.95%
6.6
Firefox 2** 6.38 6.40 2.11 36.53%
Email client
MS outlook Express 6* 6.18 5.10 1.76 39.13%
5.95
Thunderbird 1** 6.53 6.80 2.23 47.27%
Web server
IIS 5* 6.00 5.00 1.55 36.14%
5.00
apache2** 5.36 5.00 1.50 18.75%
office
MS office 2003* 8.11 9.30 1.91 67.72%
8.45
openoffice2** 7.61 7.60 1.79 63.16%
operating 
system
Windows 2000* 6.58 7.20 2.10 57.92%
6.8
Windows XP* 6.67 7.20 2.16 57.92%
Mac oS X 10.2* 6.18 6.80 2.13 41.33%
Red Hat  
Enterprise linux 4**
4.72 4.90 2.20 23.11%
Debian 3.1** 4.75 4.90 2.21 23.19%
Database 
Management 
System
mySQl 5** 5.05 4.90 2.02 12.12%
6.15
PostgreSQl 8** 6.17 6.80 1.89 36.00%
oracle 10g* 5.96 5.50 2.05 33.33%
DB2 v8* 6.22 7.2 2.75 53.85%
 * closed source software median of medians = 6.8
 ** open source softwareµ median of medians = 5.7
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I analyze the severity of vulnerabilities 
for each software package in terms 
of the median and the proportion of 
highly severe vulnerabilities. Mean, 
standard deviation and, for each ap-
plication type, the median of medians 
is also given (see Table 3). The analysis 
provides the following results:
˲˲ The medians of medians reveal 
that the vulnerabilities of office prod-
ucts are much more severe (8.45) than 
those of Web servers (5.0), while the 
values of the other application types 
are close to each other. However, a sta-
tistical analysis of the medians is not 
reasonable here due to the low number 
of values.”
˲˲ When we determine the medians 
of medians of open source software 
(5.7) and closed source software (6.8) 
and also the corresponding medians 
of the proportions of highly severe 
vulnerabilities (30.28% and 45.95%, re-
spectively), the first impression is that 
open source software is more secure 
in terms of the severity level. However, 
applying statistical analysis (Mann-
Whitney U-test) on the medians,a no 
statistically significant differences can 
be found: the two-tailed test provides 
a Although the severity of a vulnerability is given 
by a number, this number is at ordinal scale 
level only (due to the characteristics of the 
CVSS evaluation process). Consequently, vari-
ances of the samples cannot be determined.
patch dates, I do not analyze the time 
gap between vulnerability disclosure 
and vendors’ provision of patches, as 
the vulnerability publication dates 
contained in the NVD do not necessar-
ily give the actual publication date (dis-
cussion earlier). In contrast to vulnera-
bility publication data, reliable data on 
patches can be (manually) collected by 
directly looking up vendors’ sites and 
vendor-neutral Web sites. More specifi-
cally, I used the following data sources 
to obtain reliable patch data: NVD, MI-
TRE site, US-CERT Vulnerability Notes 
Database, SecurityFocus, Microsoft Se-
curity Bulletins, OpenOffice.org, The 
Open Source Vulnerability Database, 
The X-Force database (IBM), Mozilla 
Foundation Security Advisories, Red 
Hat Network, Apache Security Reports, 
Apple Mailing Lists, IBM FixPaks, VU-
PEN Security, mySQL Forge, and Oracle 
Security Alerts and Patch Updates. 
The newly compiled data pool con-
tains patch data on the aforemen-
tioned browsers, email clients, Web 
servers, office products, operating 
systems, and database management 
systems. In cases where vulnerabilities 
have not been patched by those ven-
dors regarded as “responsible” by NIST 
(NVD), I manually checked the MITRE 
description of these vulnerabilities. On 
the basis of this inspection I decided 
whether it’s the responsibility of a par-
ticular vendor to provide a patch or not. 
a high number for p (p=0.11). Applying 
the same test to the proportion figures, 
the test, again, does not indicate that 
the samples are significantly different 
at the 0.05 level (p=0.06).b
Vendors’ Patching behavior
Patch data. While the analysis of vul-
nerabilities and their publication re-
fers to the first three phases of the 
software vulnerability life cycle, and 
thereby mirrors the behavior of soft-
ware communities in terms of creating, 
detecting, and publishing vulnerabili-
ties, the investigation of the provision 
of patches aims at identifying how 
vendors behave in actively addressing 
and finally removing vulnerability is-
sues. In order to detect differences in 
the patching behavior of open source 
and closed source vendors, I analyze 
how many of the vulnerabilities re-
mained unpatched and whether any 
correlation between the patch status 
and the severity of vulnerabilities ex-
ists. Although vendor sites provide 
b In contrast to severities of vulnerabilities, pro-
portions of highly severe vulnerabilities are at 
cardinal level. As the equality of the sample 
variances cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level 
(Fsample = 1.62 < 3.5 =F(7,8), the assumption that 
samples are normally distributed cannot be re-
jected at the 0.05 level (Kolmogorov-Smirnow 
test), we assume that variances are approxi-
mately equal so that the Mann-Whitney U-test 
can be applied.
table 4. Patched and unpatched vulnerabilities.
application type Product
Vulnerabilities (un)patched median of severities
#vuln. #vuln. unpatched Prop. of unpatched vuln. unpatched patched overall
Browser
Internet Explorer 7 74 49 66.22% 5.0 9.3 6.8
Firefox 2 167 34 20.36% 5.0 6.8 6.4
Email client
MS outlook Express 6 23 15 65.22% 5.0 7.3 5.1
Thunderbird 1 110 6 5.45% 3.45 6.95 6.8
Web server
IIS 5 83 40 48.19% 5.0 7.2 5.0
apache2 80 21 26.25% 4.7 5.0 5.0
office
MS office 2003 99 4 4.04% 5.05 9.3 9.3
openoffice2 19 4 21.05% 5.25 9.3 7.6
operating system
Windows 2000 385 117 30.39% 5.1 9.3 7.6
Windows XP 297 91 30.64% 5.0 7.2 7.2
Mac oS X 10.2 300 20 6.67% 5.0 6.8 6.8
Red Hat Enterprise linux 4 264 79 14.77% 4.9 4.9 4.9
Debian 3.1 207 30 14.48% 4.9 4.9 4.9
Database Management 
System
mySQl 5 33 8 24.24% 4.6 4.9 4.9
PostgreSQl 8 25 3 12.00% 9.0 6.3 6.8
oracle 10g 63 8 12.70% 7.35 5.5 5.5
138    communications of the acm    |   May 2011  |   vol.  54  |   no.  5
contributed articles
In the few cases where I regarded the 
assigned vendor as not being responsi-
ble, I did not count the vulnerability as 
unpatched (by that particular vendor).
 (un)patched Vulnerabilities
Table 4 shows aggregated patch data 
for each software package. Vulnerabili-
ties for which I could not find any patch 
information by Feb. 28, 2009 are classi-
fied as unpatched. As I used NVD xml 
data feeds as available on Jan. 31, 2009, 
the analysis considers a time gap of four 
weeks in order to account for delays in 
vendors’ patching behavior, such as 
those due to “patch release days.”
It is remarkable to see that 17.6% 
(30.4%) of the published open (closed) 
source software vulnerabilities (in 
terms of the median) are still un-
patched. However, standard deviations 
differ enormously (6.9% and 24.7%, 
respectively). Apparently, the propor-
tion of still unpatched vulnerabilities 
largely depends on the specific vendor. 
I discuss this behavior in detail below.
Interestingly, the case of Microsoft 
also shows that even the same vendor 
can display different patching behav-
ior, depending on the particular ap-
plication type: while only 4% of MS 
Office 2003 vulnerabilities remain un-
patched, one out of three vulnerabili-
ties of both operating systems remain 
unpatched, half of the vulnerabilities 
of IIS are still open, and even two out 
of three vulnerabilities of the Internet 
clients remain unpatched. The case of 
operating systems shows that the pro-
portion of unpatched vulnerabilities of 
software cannot be explained by simply 
considering the number of vulnerabili-
ties, it rather depends on the vendors’ 
patching priorities.
severity of (un)Patched 
Vulnerabilities
It is interesting to compare the severity 
median of unpatched vulnerabilities 
with the median of patched vulnerabili-
ties, in order to detect vendors’ patch-
ing priorities, and to detect differences 
between open source and closed source 
software. The data in Table 4 reveals 
that, for all six Microsoft products, 
there is a strong bias toward patching 
severe vulnerabilities. This result in-
dicates that Microsoft decides to leave 
less severe vulnerabilities unpatched, 
probably because the economic efforts 
would not be compensated by the (mi-
nor) gain in software security. However, 
on the other hand, the result also shows 
that Microsoft is interested in patching 
the most severe vulnerabilities, which 
reveals that software security is regard-
ed to be a serious market issue. Apple 
(MAC OS X) shows a similar behavior in 
their operating system in terms of the 
severities of patched and unpatched 
vulnerabilities, but, in contrast to Mi-
crosoft, Apple seems to be interested 
in patching most of the vulnerabilities. 
We find this strong interest in patching 
vulnerabilities also in the cases of Ora-
cle and IBM (DB2), but the severity me-
dians of unpatched vulnerabilities are 
higher than those of the patched ones. 
To sum up, three out of four closed 
source software vendors leave only a 
few vulnerabilities unpatched, while 
the other vendor focuses on patching 
more severe vulnerabilities.
Regarding the medians of patched 
and unpatched vulnerabilities of open 
source vendors, I do not find any pat-
tern. In addition, the patching behav-
ior of open source vendors shows that 
the proportion of unpatched vulnera-
bilities varies between 12% and 26.25%, 
and can differ considerably. On the oth-
er hand, none of the eight open source 
software packages shows an outlier, in 
contrast to closed source software.
As a result of the analysis of the 
patching behavior of software vendors, 
it turns out the behavior is not mainly 
determined by the particular software 
development style, but by the policy of 
the particular vendor.
threats to Validity
Although the presented empirical study 
uses comprehensive data on vulnera-
bilities and patches of widely deployed 
software packages, and manual work 
was carried out in order to check and to 
improve data quality, some threats to 
the validity of results remain. First, the 
analysis investigates only those vulner-
abilities that have been published as 
CVE vulnerabilities, that is, it excludes 
vulnerabilities that have not been dis-
closed at all or have not been included 
in the MITRE CVE dictionary. Second, 
neither the “Assigned date” provided by 
MITRE nor the “Original release date” 
included in the NVD necessarily mirror 
the actual date of vulnerability disclo-
sure to the public. I am not aware of any 
in contrast to 
vulnerability data, 
patch data is  
even more difficult  
to obtain. to 
facilitate further 
analysis and to 
avoid the tedious 
collection of 
patch information, 
comprehensive  
data pools  
would be useful.
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data sources that provide reliable and 
complete information on actual disclo-
sure dates. Third, the CVE-to-vendor/
product mapping (CPE) in the NVD is 
incomplete and not always clear with 
regard to which vendor is responsible 
for releasing a patch. The mapping was 
manually inspected by myself. In some 
cases, conflicts were resolved by adopt-
ing my point of view. Fourth, MTBVD 
values are limited in their validity, as 
missing market and software factors of 
packages (for example, market share, 
SLOC) would need to be considered.
The analysis and comparison of 
open source and closed source soft-
ware packages reveals that the type of 
software development is not the prima-
ry driver of software security in terms of 
the development of vulnerability dis-
closure over time, the severity of pub-
lished vulnerabilities, and unpatched 
vulnerabilities and their severity. Con-
sequently, we should explore other 
factors rather than asking whether 
open source or closed source software 
leads to higher levels of security. One 
approach would be to investigate the 
technical roots of vulnerabilities, for 
example by adopting the “Common 
Weakness Enumeration” scheme pro-
vided by MITRE. This approach might 
help to explain differences between 
various software types with regard to 
the severity of vulnerabilities. Unfortu-
nately, the NVD provides CWE values 
for only a few vulnerabilities, so that we 
need a more comprehensive data set. 
A second approach would be the com-
parison of MTBVD values by identifying 
and considering software and market 
factors. We could then apply regres-
sion models, and control for these fac-
tors. As the sound application of such 
models also requires the availability of 
the actual dates of vulnerability disclo-
sures, we would need more precise data 
than is currently available. To sum up, 
we still face several data problems that 
impede the identification and explana-
tion of differences in software security.
In contrast to vulnerability data, 
patch data is even more difficult to ob-
tain. In order to facilitate further analy-
sis and to avoid the tedious collection 
of patch information, comprehensive 
data pools would be useful. The analy-
sis of vendors’ patching behavior shows 
a diffuse picture that misses clear pat-
terns. We find patching behaviors that 
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do not only differ between vendors but 
also between different products of the 
same vendor (Microsoft). However, 
high figures of unpatched vulnerabili-
ties show that exogenous incentives for 
software vendors to avoid vulnerabili-
ties and/or to provide patches still need 
to be amplified, although a bias toward 
patching most severe vulnerabilities 
occurs. Economic countermeasures 
may provide such incentives.3,4
conclusion
This work has presented the first com-
prehensive empirical study on the se-
curity of open source and closed source 
security. It compared 17 well known 
and widely deployed software packages 
regarding published vulnerabilities 
and software vendors’ patching behav-
ior. The empirical results have shown 
that open source and closed source 
software do not significantly differ in 
terms of the severity of vulnerabilities, 
the type of  development of vulnerabil-
ity disclosure over time, and vendors’ 
patching behavior. Although open 
source software development seems 
to prevent “extremely bad” patching 
behavior, overall there is no empirical 
evidence that the particular type of soft-
ware development is the primary driver 
of security. Rather, the policy of the par-
ticular vendor determines the patch-
ing behavior. Consequently, in order 
to make software less vulnerable, it is 
most important to provide strong eco-
nomic incentives for software produc-
ers to provide patches (at least for pub-
lished vulnerabilities) or, even better, 
to avoid vulnerabilities from the outset.
acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Christo-
pher Johnson, Program Manager of the 
NIST National Vulnerability Database, 
for valuable discussions and the provi-
sion of background information, and 
Eliot Rich for his assistance in devel-
oping the manuscript. I appreciate the 
critical remarks of three anonymous re-
viewers. All errors are the sole responsi-
bility of the author. 
References
1. Alhazmi, O., Malaiya, Y., ray, i. Measuring, analyzing 
and predicting security vulnerabilities in software 
systems. Computers & Security 26, 3 (2007) 219-228.
2. Anderson, r. Open and closed systems are equivalent 
(that is, in an ideal world). Perspectives on Free 
and Open Source Software. J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, 
S.A.  Hissam,  and k.r. Lakhani (eds). Mit Press, 
cambridge, MA, 2005, 127–142.
